I Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2008 -2009 -one of the largest in the developed world. The Australian package contrasts against those of some major economies with regard to the instruments used to bolster activity. 1 Over 50 percent of the ARRA revolved around tax reductions, whilst the Australian package was mainly comprised of more active spending measures -transfers to households and expenditures on public works.
There are conflicting views regarding whether the Australian fiscal stimulus package is a success or not. Some believe that it has helped the Australian economy to avoid a recession that was experienced in the aftermath of the GFC by most of the developed economies, and others view it as unnecessary and blame it for the rising public debt of the Federal government. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on this debate. We focus on the transfer side of the stimulus package, which is valued at about 50 percent of the total package, and quantify its macroeconomic effects using an estimated DSGE model.
The model we use to conduct the analysis builds on the standard small open economy DSGE model of Gali and Monacelli (2005) . The main addition is to include government transfers and assume two types of households -Ricardian and non-Ricardian, where non-Ricardian households are unable to smooth consumption by trading securities. The inclusion of non-Ricardian households is to represent a large fraction of Australian households that have low to middle income and are major recipients of government transfers. It also makes it easy to handle the income test of the stimulus transfers; transfers are simplify given to non-Ricardian households. The macroeconomic dynamics of the small open economy are jointly driven by three domestic shocks-productivity shock, fiscal shock and monetary policy shock, and one external shock-world output shock.
The model is estimated with a Bayesian approach, using pre-crisis Australian data (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) ).
The estimated model implies impulse response functions to the four exogenous shocks that are consistent with economic intuition. A cumulative fiscal multiplier is also computed to further examine the cumulative effects of a fiscal shock, which takes on a value of 1.04 on impact, suggesting that the increase in output resulting from an increase in government transfer is slightly larger than one for one. This result lends some support to the use of fiscal transfer as a demand-stimulating tool by the government.
We then conduct various simulation experiments to evaluate the effects of the stimulus transfers.
The timing and magnitudes of the shocks used in the experiments are carefully calibrated. These include two world output shocks that represent the onset of GFC to the Australian economy, two fiscal shocks that mimic the two rounds of stimulus transfers in the Australian fiscal stimulus package, one negative fiscal shock that represents anticipated budgetary cut-backs that may take place in face of rising public debt, as well as two accommodative monetary policy shocks underlying a series of RBA's rate cuts at the time. We feed different combinations of shocks into different experiments to see how the economy would behave with GFC shocks alone, with GFC and fiscal shocks, with GFC and both fiscal and monetary shocks, and so on. A comparison of the results then gives us an idea of how the government interventions may have worked.
Our results suggest that the fiscal stimulus was quite effective in reversing the adverse impacts of the GFC on domestic output. However, the scale of the stimulus transfers seems to be excessive.
The first fiscal shock administered in the March 2009 quarter causes output to overshoot steady state to 1.18 percent on impact from a negative deviation of 0.76 percent in its absence, then the second fiscal shock in the June 2009 quarter causes output to rise above trend by 3.38 percent.
Such stimulus effects are even stronger with accommodative monetary policy. However, the stimulus effects in the short run may be ultimately undone as a result of a necessary budgetary contraction in the medium to long run. The experiment shows that a negative fiscal shock administered in the September 2011 quarter, which aims to reduce the government debt caused by the stimulus fiscal and monetary actions by 10 percent, significantly reduces output and causes it to remain below trend for more than a year. Another interesting finding is that the stimulus transfers may have served a redistributional role. Both types of households suffer from the GFC shocks, however, the two fiscal shocks greatly benefit the non-Ricardians at the expense of the Ricardian households.
This study is one of the few studies on the Australian stimulus package, a majority of which are empirical studies. Leigh (2012) uses household survey data to examine how much the stimulus package has boosted demand. Vu and Tanton (2010) use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to examine the distributional impacts of the stimulus transfers. Ergas and Robson (2009) use a cost-benefit analysis to examine the effect of the stimulus package on national welfare. Makin (2010) uses national accounts data to study whether the package helped Australia to remain economically prosperous in the face of the GFC. Using a more structural analysis, this study provides new insights into the demand-boosting role, the redistributional and welfare implications of the stimulus package that are examined in the existing literature.
This study is the first to evaluate the Australian fiscal stimulus package using a DSGE analysis.
It belongs to a recent literature that seeks to evaluate a particular fiscal initiative in response to the GFC using a DSGE framework. Davig and Leeper (2009) estimate the fiscal multiplier in a model where both fiscal and monetary policies can vary between being active and passive and apply this model to estimate the multipliers associated with the ARRA. Cogan, et al. (2010) make use of a DSGE model to examine the effect of government purchases, tax cuts and transfers under the ARRA on U.S. output. Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) conduct a similar analysis of the ARRA in the context of a DSGE model with credit constrained households, distortionary taxation and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Coenen, et al. (2012 ), Forni, et al. (2009 ) and Cwik and Wieland (2011 examine the effects of EERP using estimated DSGE models for the Euro area.
A focus of all these studies is to estimate the fiscal multiplier to a specific fiscal shock. Our study goes beyond this by conducting carefully designed experiments.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II describes the Australian fiscal stimulus package in more details. Section III and IV describe the model and its estimation. Section V details the simulation experiments and the results. Section VI provides concluding remarks, in particular, discusses the limitations of the study and possible directions for future research.
II The Australian Fiscal Stimulus Package
This section provides more details of the Australian fiscal stimulus package. In total, the Federal government implemented five separate stimulus initiatives in response to the GFC -the first was announced in late 2008 and the last in mid 2009. These initiatives were the Economic Security Strategy (ESS), the Nation Building Package (NBP), the Nation Building and Jobs Plan (NBJP), the Skills Jobs Package and the 2009 Federal Budget. Collectively, these five initiatives are referred to as the stimulus package.
The initiatives involved investment expenditure on public works as well as transfers to households. In this paper, we focus on the transfer-side of the stimulus package, as these handouts were temporary and fit nicely the concept of once-off fiscal shocks within the DSGE framework. In contrast, the public investment-side of the package involves construction projects which take up to a few years to complete, so it is more difficult to justify such public expenditures as being temporary and unanticipated by economic agents in the model. We therefore give more details of the stimulus initiatives that involved transfer spending.
In October 2008, the Economic Security Strategy (ESS) was announced -the majority of this initiative involved lump-sum transfers to households. This package was valued at $10.4 billion (0.85 percent of 2008 GDP) in total. Lump-sum transfers, under this initiative, were comprised of $4.8 billion to pensioners, $3.9 billion to low and middle-income families receiving Family Tax Benefit A, as well as $1.5 billion to first-home buyers.
In February 2009, the Nation Building and Jobs Plan (NBJP) was introduced. In total, the NBJP was valued at $42 billion 
III The Model
The model developed is a simple small open economy DSGE model that is of the type introduced by Gali and Monacelli (2005) . The home economy trades in final-produced goods with the rest of the world. The main modification is in the specification of households. We allow for the coexistence of two types of households which differ in their consumption behaviour. The first type, referred to as Ricardian households, are able to smooth consumption through trading securities internationally.
The second variety, non-Ricardian households, have no such access to securities markets and must therefore consume all their income in a given period.
The inclusion of non-Ricardian households has been considered in many studies that examine the effects of government expenditure using structural models (see Gali, et al., 2007 for example) .
It helps generate a positive response of private consumption to government spending shock. NonRicardian households in our model represent a sizable fraction of low to middle income households in Australia that are reliant upon government transfers (pensions, family tax benefits A and B, student assistance) for a living. These households tend to consume all of their income and have little savings. On the other hand, the inclusion of non-Ricardian households make it easy to handle the income test of the fiscal stimulus transfer-in the model the stimulus transfers are simply given to the non-Ricardian households. In fact the majority of those who received the stimulus package cheques were of a low to middle income status and were already in receipt of welfare payments.
Another minor extension to the basic framework is to include habit formation in consumption, which has been considered in recent estimated small open economy models, see Justiano and Preston (2010) and Matheson (2010) for examples.
We next briefly describe the model. Readers are referred to Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Justiano and Preston (2010) for a more detailed description of small open economy DSGE models of the type. Appendix A gives details of the log-linearised system.
(i) Households
The home small open economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households. A share 1 − µ of this continuum are Ricardian households and the remaining share µ are non-Ricardian households. The preferences of both types of households are given by 2
where C t denotes a composite consumption index of domestically-made and foreign-made goods, N t is the labour supply, β is the discount factor, h is the parameter of habit persistence, and σ, ϕ are the inverse elasticities of intertemporal substitution and labour supply respectively.
The consumption index C t is given by
where C H,t and C F,t are the standard CES aggregators of the differentiated home goods and foreign goods, respectively, η is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, and α is the share of foreign-produced goods in the consumption bundle.
The optimal allocation of expenditure between domestic and foreign goods implies that
where P H,t and P F,t are the price indices of domestically and foreign-produced goods respectively, and P t is the consumer price index (CPI) defined as
Ricardian households are assumed to have access to a complete set of contingent claims, trading internationally. They are shareholders of firms and hence receive profits from firms in every period.
2 Note that the flow utility specification is of the King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) (KPR henceforth) form. It is well known that the KPR specification is consistent with balanced growth facts. However, the KPR specification is less likely to yield a positive response of private consumption to an increase in government spending, compared with another widely used specification in the small open economy literature-the Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) preference. See Monacelli and Perotti (2009) for a detailed discussion on this result. The inclusion of NonRicardian households thus help generate a positive response of private consumption to the fiscal stimulus.
They also pay a lump-sum tax to the government in every period. 3 The flow budget constraint for a representative Ricardian household is given by
where C t,O and N t,O denote the consumption and labour supply of the Ricardian or optimising consumer (the subscript 'O' stands for 'optimising'), D t+1 is the nominal payoff in period t + 1 of the portfolio of contingent claims held at the end of period t (which also includes shares in firms), Q t,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period-ahead nominal payoffs that is relevant to domestic households, T t is the nominal lump-sum tax, and W t is the nominal wage rate. A Ricardian household's problem is characterised by the following conditions
where Π t+1 ≡ P t+1 /P t is the gross inflation rate.
Non-Ricardian households are unable to save through trading securities or holding shares of firms. They also pay a lump-tax T t to the government, but at the same time they receive a transfer payment from the government in terms of home-produced final goods, G t (so that each of them receives G t /µ). So a non-Ricardian household's flow budget constraint is given by
and his choice of labour supply N t,N (the subscript 'N' stands for 'non-Recardian') is characterised
Aggregate consumption and labour supply are then defined as
(ii) Firms
The home differentiated goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] are produced by a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms, owned by Ricardian households and subject to the Calvo-style price setting behaviour. The j th firm's production function is given by
where N t (j) is the labour input employed by firm j and A t is the domestic productivity which evolves exogenously according to the following law of motion
where ε A,t denotes the domestic productivity shock andĀ is the steady state value of A t . The aggregate output index is defined as
where ε is the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated goods.
Let θ denote the probability that a firm will not be able to adjust its price in a given period, and P H,t (j) as the optimal price for good j chosen by firm j if it gets to adjust its price in period t. Then firm j's problem is to choose P H,t (j) to maximise its expected discounted profits
where Y t+k (j) is the demand for variety j given by
M C n t+k (j) is the nominal marginal cost of firm j in period t+k which is simply defined as M C n t (j) = W t /A t , and Q t,t+k is the stochastic discount factor for k-period-ahead payoffs that reflects the discounting of firm profits by its share holders-the Ricardian households. The first order condition for the firm's problem is given by
We consider a symmetric equilibrium in which all firms that get to reset their prices in period t choose an identical price P * H,t , then the price index for home-produced goods is given by
Two branches of government operate within the home small open economy -the parliament, who has fiscal policy at its disposal, and the central bank, who controls the conduct of monetary policy.
The fiscal authority raises taxes, issues government bonds, and purchases final goods G t from home firms and transfer them to non-Ricardian households. G t is defined as a CES aggregator of home-produced goods
This then implies the government demand function for the j th variety
Following Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004), we assume that G t accounts for a time-varying share of output and this share evolves exogenously. That is,
and assume that Λ t follows an exogenous process
where ε Λ,t denotes the fiscal shock andΛ is the steady state value of Λ t .
The government budget constraint is given by
where B t is the one-period nominal government bonds and R t is the nominal gross interest rate on government bonds. Complete domestic and international securities market implies that
For monetary policy, the home central bank is assumed to follow a Talor-type rule
where R T t is the target interest rate, ρ R ∈ (0, 1) is an interest rate smoothing parameter, and ε R,t denotes the monetary policy shock. The target interest rate follows an output gap rule
whereR is the steady state value of R t , and Π T t , Y T t are the targeted inflation rate and potential output respectively. The parameters ψ 1 and ψ 2 capture the responsiveness of the target interest rate to fluctuations in inflation and output respectively.
(iv) International Risk Sharing
Under the assumption of complete markets for securities trading internationally, a condition analogous to (6) also holds for a representative household in any other country, say country i: 4
We assume that households in foreign economies are all Ricardian households.
where P i t is the CPI of country i and ξ i,t is the bilateral nominal exchange rate (the price of country i's currency in terms of domestic currency). This implies that
where v is a constant and
Pt is the bilateral real exchange rate between the home country and country i.
Define the effective real exchange rate Q t as
and the effective terms of trade S t as
Following Gali and Monacelli (2005), we assume that the law of one price holds for individual goods at all times. Under this assumption, there exists a relationship between Q t and S t which is utilised in the linearisation (see Appendix A)
(v) General Equilibrium
Goods market clearing for the j th domestic good variety is given by
where C * H,t (j) is the exports of the j th variety to the rest of the world. This condition states that output is divided into domestic consumption, exports, and government acquisitions for the transfer payments. Combining this equation with Eq. (13) and (17) gives the following resource constraint for the home economy
where C * H,t is the total demand by the rest of the world for domestically-produced goods, defined
Market clearing condition for the world economy is simply given by
where
We assume that the world output Y * t evolves exogenously according to the following law of motion
This world output shock is the only exogenous shock, to which the home small economy is subject. It summarises all external disturbances to the home economy.
In open economy DSGE studies, additional exogenous shocks, such as exogenous world inflation shock, world output shock and world interest rate shocks, are often incorporated to capture the influences of the world economy on the home small open economy, and in particular, to capture the movements in exchange rate. The consideration to focus on one exogenous shock is two-fold.
First, it will greatly simplify the simulations later on, as we do not have to worry about how the GFC should be simulated as a combination of exogenous shocks. Second, we do not attempt to capture the movements in exchange rate using this simple model. Open economy DSGE studies often impose additional relationships to model the movements in exchange rate, such as purchasing power parity (PPP) (e.g., Schorfheide, 2005, 2007) and uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition (e.g., Gali and Monacelli, 2005) . However, as shown in many studies (e.g., Schorfheide, 2005, and Adolfson, et al., 2008) , standard DSGE models with a PPP or UIP condition have very limited success in explaining exchange rate movements. So we abstract from modeling the evolution of exchange rate, that is, we do not impose an additional PPP or UIP condition to capture the movements in exchange rate-making the inclusion of an exogenous world inflation shock or world interest rate shock unnecessary.
IV Calibration and Estimation
We estimate the model with Australian data using the Bayesian approach described by An and Schorfheide (2007) . All figures and tables are presented in Appendix B.
(i) Data
As there are four structural shocks in the model, four data series are used for the estimation of the model. They correspond to the observables for output growth rate, inflation rate, domestic interest rate and growth rate of government transfer payments. All series are at a quarterly frequency and are demeaned before being used in the estimation. The interest rate data series is obtained from the Output growth rate refers to the first difference in the natural logarithm of chain-volume GDP series (ABS series A2304334J). For growth rate of government transfers, we use the first difference in the natural logarithm of total national personal benefits payments (ABS series A2301974A). 6
Inflation rate refers to the first difference in the natural logarithm of the consumer price index (ABS series A2325846C). We adjust for the introduction of the goods and services tax (GST) in accordance with Valadkhani and Layton (2004) -inflation rose by an extra 2.8 percent in September 2000 as a result of the introduction of GST. We use the 90 day bank rate (RBA data series FIRMMBAB90)
as the interest rate. This data series is at monthly frequency; a quarterly interest rate is formed by averaging over observations of the three months in a quarter. An augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test shows that all these four series can be viewed as stationary.
The use of data for output growth, inflation and interest rates in the estimation of DSGE models is standard practice in the literature, while using government transfer data as opposed to exchange rate or international trade data seems less conventional. The consideration is that the major focus of this paper is to examine the effect of Australia's fiscal stimulus package rather than Australia's interactions with foreign economies. Using the transfer payment data will allow us to capture a more accurate set of parameter estimates for this purpose. For instance, the fiscal policy persistence parameter, ρ Λ , has important implications for the package's effect -the transfer growth data sheds 5 The GFC is commonly believed to have begun in July 2007 with the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the U.S.. However, it did not seriously impact on the Australian economy until early 2008 with a series of declines in the value of shares on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX).
6 We obtain this series from Table 19 in the ABS publication 5206.0. This data series summarises nominal transfer payments to households from the Federal government, disaggregated into sickness, ex-servicemen, disablement, old age, unemployment, family and child and other benefits. direct light on the true value of this parameter.
(ii) Calibrated Parameters and Prior Distributions
To reduce the number of free parameters in the estimation, we calibrate some parameters to values commonly used in the literature or the data. The calibrated parameters are reported in Table 1 .
The value of α, the openness parameter for Australia, is calibrated using international trade data prior to the estimation. As is done in Justiniano and Preston (2010) , α is calibrated by taking the average share of total imports (ABS series A2303825J) and exports (ABS series A2303824F) to GDP (ABS series A2304418T), which gives a value of 0.20. This figure is consistent with values used in other DSGE studies on the Australian economy; for example, Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) estimate it to be 0.21. The discount factor, β, is calculated as one divided by one plus the average net real interest rate in the data.
The proportion of non-Ricardian households, µ, is an important parameter for the question we aim to address. The model implies that the higher µ is, the more responsive the economy would be to the fiscal transfer so that the fiscal stimulus could be more effective. The value of µ is chosen Standard prior distributions are chosen for the parameters to be estimated, as reported in Table 2 . The parameters in the interest rate rule have priors that are consistent with an inflationtargeting central bank following a Taylor rule. The three elasticity parameters (σ, ϕ, η) are allocated relatively wide Gamma priors centred at unity. We assign uninformative beta and inverse Gamma priors to the parameters that determine the persistence and variability of the exogenous variables, allowing the data to distinguish between strongly or weakly persistent/volatile processes. The 7 TheḠ/Ȳ andWN /PC ratios are calculated using corresponding nominal variables, where nominal consumption, PtCt, uses the current price final consumption data series (ABS series A2302236T), total labour income, WtNt, comes from the compensation of employees -wages and salaries data (ABS series A2303355A), and nominal output, PtYt, uses the current prices GDP data (ABS series A2304418T).
Calvo and habit formation parameters both have a Beta prior with mean 0.5, as commonly used in the literature. The Calvo parameter, θ, is estimated to be 0.55 at posterior mean, suggesting that the average duration of price stickiness is around 7 months. This estimate is a bit lower than that attained in Justiniano and Preston (2010) , a value of 0.79. The difference may be explained by our inclusion of the non-Ricardian households. Given that they are not able to save to smooth consumption, their consumption behaviour is quite volatile. This greater volatility in consumption could translate into more frequent adjustments of prices by firms to manage demand -reflected by a lower θ.
(iii) Estimation results
The estimates of the interest rate rule parameters are quite similar to other studies. For instance, Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) estimate their values to be 1.83, 0.21 and 0.73 for ψ 1 , ψ 2 and ρ R respectively for Australia. The estimated standard errors for the shock processes come out to be roughly similar at posterior means, except that the world output shock is almost twice as volatile as the others. Such a result seems to be consistent with the interpretation we place upon Y * t -as capturing all disturbances that emanate from abroad.
(iv) Impulse Responses
Before we utilise the estimated model to investigate the effectiveness of the fiscal stimulus package, we first have a look at the general macroeconomic effects of an exogenous fiscal shock implied by the estimated model. These effects are illustrated by standard impulse response functions and a fiscal multiplier analysis. A positive world output shock leads to many effects which seem to be desirable for the domestic economy. First, the shock results in a decline in the real exchange rate in accordance with the international risk sharing condition, which translates into a fall in the terms of trade by 1 percent on impact. The fall in the terms of trade implies a fall in the relative prices of foreign goods as well as the overall consumer prices, i.e., it imposes a downward pressure on domestic inflation. As a result, the consumption of domestic Ricardian and non-Ricardian households both increases, by 0.21 and 0.28 percent respectively, and the consumption expenditure switches toward foreign goods.
On the other hand, the world output shock also leads to higher demand for Australian-produced goods, causing a rise in domestic output on impact and hence an upward pressure on domestic inflation. However, the rise in domestic output is only by 0.073 percent on impact, due to the compositional shift in consumption toward foreign goods resulting from the lower terms of trade (see Eq. (30)). 8 The effect on real marginal cost of domestic production is also two fold, a positive effect through its effect on consumption and output and a negative effect through a fall in the terms of trade (see Eq. (33)). The overall effects on marginal cost and on inflation is a rise by 0.1 percent and a fall by 0.2 percent on impact, respectively. The fall in inflation then leads to a drop in the interest rate by 0.3 percent on impact.
The impulse responses to the monetary policy shock and domestic productivity shock are standard. A higher interest rate raises the opportunity cost of consumption for the Ricardian households -they shift from purchasing goods to bonds, causing a fall in consumption and output on impact.
Consequently, real marginal cost and inflation fall on impact. The fall in consumption also leads to a fall in the terms of trade through international risk sharing, which further reduces marginal cost and inflation. Hence, the traditional interest rate channel to fight inflation is strengthened in the open economy. A positive productivity shock improves the effectiveness of the labour input in producing output, resulting a fall in marginal cost and a rise in output on impact. As a result, inflation falls and consumption rises. The dampened inflationary pressure leads the central bank to lower interest rates. The rise in the terms of trade on impact is due to the fact that the increase in domestic productivity reduces the prices of Australian goods relative to foreign goods.
(v) Fiscal Multipliers
A cumulative fiscal multiplier is computed, which quantifies the cumulative effects of an initial fiscal shock on output over certain periods. Its definition originates from Uhlig (2010) and has been adopted by many other studies (e.g., Leeper, et al., 2011 and Coenen, et al., 2012 ). In the current context, it is defined as
where P V k denotes the cumulative multiplier over k periods,R is the steady state gross nominal interest rate, andŷ t andĝ t are log deviations of output (Y t ) and transfer spending (G t ) from their corresponding steady state valuesȲ andḠ. P V k measures the present value of movements in output relative to those in the transfer payments over k periods as induced by a positive fiscal shock at period t. Note that this expression simplifies to the impact multiplier for k = 0.
As we focus on the short-run effects, in our simulation we allow for government debt to accumulate following the fiscal shock and do not adjust taxes or transfers to reduce government debt. Figure 5 plots the computed cumulative multiplier for a 1 percent fiscal shock. The multiplier takes on a value of 1.04 on impact, suggesting that a 1 percent increase in government spending will generate an increase in output which is slightly larger than one-for-one. The driving-force behind this result is the presence of the non-Ricardian households-they induce aggregate consumption to rise from the fiscal shock. The two sources of increased demand for goods, households and the government, cause output to rise by a greater amount than the initial shock. This result lends some support to the use of fiscal transfer as a demand-stimulating tool by the Federal government. Figure 5 also shows that the cumulative multiplier declines in the subsequent periods after the initial shock-eventually settling at a value of 0.71 after around seven quarters.
There has been a lot of empirical work on fiscal multipliers, which has produced estimates of impact multipliers for government spending shocks that range from below 0.5 to above 1 (see Spilimbergo, et al., 2009 ). Our estimate of the impact multiplier falls in this range, although using a structural approach. Coenen, et al. (2012) present a comprehensive study that uses seven structural policy models to estimate fiscal multipliers for different types of fiscal instruments. The transfer spending in our model corresponds to the targeted transfers to liquidity constrianted households in their models. They find that this fiscal instrument is a particularly effective way of boosting output in the short run, indicated by the relatively large accumulative multipliers over the first few periods. 9 In Experiment 3, some additional monetary policy shocks that represent the accommodative monetary policy of the RBA after the GFC are also fed into the simulation, on top of the GFC and fiscal shocks. The aim is to examine whether the fiscal stimulus is more effective when it is combined with monetary accommodation. Many studies have found that fiscal policy is most effective if monetary policy is accommodative (e.g., see Coenen et al., 2012) .
V Effects of the Stimulus Transfer (i) Design of Experiments
Experiment 4 attempts to shed some light on the medium to long run effects of the stimulus package due to its negative budgetary implications, although our main focus is on the short-run effects. It builds on Experiment 3, with the addition of a negative fiscal shock a couple of years after the stimulus transfers are administered. The negative fiscal shock represents anticipated budgetary cut-backs that may take place in face of rising public debt. In fact, the fiscal stimulus package contributed to a budget deficit of 2.2 percent for the Australian Federal government in 2008-2009, a reverse of budget status from the previous 10 years, and the fiscal balance continued to stay negative since then. To meet the budget challenges, the former labour government had to take several budget cuts in past few years, and more severe budget cuts were proposed by the coalition government in the newly-released 2014-15 budget plan.
All four experiments start from the March 2008 quarter, where all variables are assumed to be in steady state. Table 3 summarises the timing and magnitudes of the shocks used in the experiments.
Details of the calibration of these shocks are described below.
(ii) Calibration of Shocks
Calibration of the GFC Shocks
As the GFC is originated in the US financial system, it is reasonable to view it as one of the exogenous disturbances to the Australian economy, which are summarised by the world output shock in the model. To calibrate the GFC shock, we examine the growth rate of output in the data. Figure 6 plots the deviations of output growth from its steady state over the crisis period- In order to calibrate the sizes of the fiscal shocks, we generate a data series for the ratio of transfer payment to output, G t /Y t , by dividing the nominal transfer payment (total personal benefits payments-ABS data series A2301974A) by the nominal GDP series (ABS series A2302467A). 
For Λ M ar09 , we calculate its value implied by the model instead of using the data value:
This gives a value of 2.67 percent for the second fiscal shock, ε Λ,Jun09 .
The negative fiscal policy shock considered in Experiment 4 is fed into the system in the September 2011 quarter. The consideration is that September 2011 was the start of a financial year which saw a federal budget with numerous cutbacks introduced, including pausing the indexation of family tax benefit payments. Given that it is introduced to capture anticipated budget cuts that are required to curb rising public debt caused by the fiscal stimulus package, we simply set its size such that the quantity of real bonds on issue in the September 2011 quarter shrinks to 90% of that in previous quarter. 12 This yields a fiscal shock of -1.25 percent.
Calibration of the Monetary Policy Shocks
We choose the timing of the expansionary monetary policy shocks to coincide with cuts made by the RBA to the official cash rate. Prior to the first reduction in September 2008, the cash rate 
Experiment 1
Recall that Experiment 1 only involves the GFC shocks and it is designed to see how the Australian economy would have behaved following the GFC shocks, in the absence of the policy interventions.
As shown in Figure 9 , the GFC shocks translate into responses of aggregate variables, which are of a detrimental nature to the Australian macroeconomy.
The first GFC shock results in a fall in the export demand for domestically-produced goods, Although consumption declines following the first GFC shock, inflation rises by 1.30 percent in the June 2008 quarter as households shift their consumption towards domestically-produced rather than imported goods due to the rise in the real exchange rate caused by the GFC shock. As output continues to contract in the September 2008 quarter, inflation falls below steady state by 0.79 percent. The inflationary threat causes interest rate to rise in the June 2008 quarter, resulting in a deviation of 2.12 percent. However interest rate is reduced considerably down to 0.17 percent above steady state in the period after as a result of the mitigated inflationary threat. The second GFC shock in December 2008 leads to similar qualitative responses in inflation and the interest rate, albeit on a larger scale due to the larger magnitude of the shock. Inflation rises enormously to 4.54 percent above trend on impact, and as a result, interest rate reaches a corresponding peak of 7.55 percent above trend. The remarkably high interest rate also contributes to the fall in the consumption of Ricardian households.
Experiment 2
Recall that Experiment 2 builds on Experiment 1 with the inclusion of the two fiscal shocks in addition to the GFC shocks, and it aims to shed some light on the successfulness of the fiscal stimulus. Given that the first round of payments had already succeeded in bolstering output at levels above trend, this seems to suggest that the second round of payments was excessive. A natural consequence of the lower interest rates is greater inflationary pressure than in Experiment 2. This is illustrated by a much higher time path of inflation in the few quarters following the monetary policy shocks, as shown in Figure 10 . In particular, inflation rises above steady state by 3.05 percent and 6.89 percent in the two quarters whereby the accommodative interest rate shocks are administered. To attend to the growing inflationary threat, the low interest rate starts to rise after the second accommodative monetary policy shock, reaching 0.71 percent above steady state in the September 2009 quarter and then slowly returning back to steady state.
Experiment 4
Recall that Experiment 4 builds on Experiment 3 with an additional negative fiscal shock administered in the September 2011 quarter. The negative fiscal shock represents anticipated budgetary cutbacks that may take place in the medium to long run in order to curb rising public debt caused by the fiscal stimulus policy. These results suggest that even though the fiscal stimulus had been beneficial in the short-run, as Experiment 2 and 3 suggest, these effects may be ultimately undone as a result of a necessary budgetary contraction in the medium to long run.
VI Concluding Remarks
Over the years 2008 and 2009, the Australian Federal government introduced a fiscal stimulus package that aimed to combat the adverse impacts of the GFC and stumulate the economy. This package included monetary transfers to households as well as public investment initiatives. This paper examined the effects of the transfer side of the stimulus package using a DSGE framework;
a simple small open economy model was developed and estimated with Australian data.
Simulation experiments were run whereby negative world output shocks were calibrated to mimic the onset of the GFC to the Australian economy and expansionary fiscal and monetary shocks were calibrated to mimic the fiscal stimulus transfers and monetary interventions at the time. Results suggest that the fiscal stimulus was quite effective in reversing the adverse impacts of the GFC, however, the scale of the stimulus transfers was perhaps excessive.
We recognise that part of this conclusion could be attributed to the relative unresponsiveness The lack of response to external shocks seems to be a common feature of the Gali and Monacelli (2005) type small open economy models, in particular, the assumptions of complete pass-through of exchange rate and complete international financial market. It would be ideal to conduct the analysis using an alternative model that is more capable of capturing the dependence of the Australian economy on the world economy, particularly the dependence on capital inflows and foreign demand for Australian minerals. Nevertheless, it is worth to see what the basic framework says about the question at hand.
We focused on the short-run effectiveness of the stimulus transfers, as that was exactly what the stimulus package was introduced for. However, as we illustrated in Experiment 4, the macroeconomic effects of such a large-scale fiscal stimulus are far-reaching; the short-run benefits may be ultimately undone as a result of a necessary budgetary contraction in the medium to long run. Indeed, the fiscal stimulus package has largely contributed to the rising public debt of the Australian Federal government and the pain-felt budget cuts of the current Coalition government. A comprehensive evaluation of the Australian fiscal stimulus package is left for future research.
constraint for non-Ricardian households yields
We assume that in steady state, the government has a balanced budget (zero debt). 14 Then the non-Ricardian household's budget constraint impliesḠ µC = 1 −WN PC /(1 − µ). We calibrateḠ Y andWN PC to match their corresponding data values.
The consumption terms and output are linked through the resource constraint, Eq. (25). Note that in (25), C H,t = (1 − α)
, and G t is given by (19). Let q i,t ,q t andŝ t denote the log deviations of Q i,t , Q t and S t from their steady state values respectively, thenq t = i q i,t di. As shown in Gali and Monacelli (2005) , the law of one price implies that
Also note from Eq. (26) thatŷ * t =ĉ * t = iĉ i t di. Utilising all these results and imposing steady state relationshipȲ * =Ȳ , the linearisation of Eq. (25) giveŝ
For open economy, the international risk-sharing condition, Eq. (24), provides another link between domestic consumption and external variables. Linearising this equation yieldŝ
Eq. (28)- (31) constitute the open economy IS-type equations.
New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
The derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve is fairly standard. First linearising the firstorder condition for the firm's problem, Eq. (15), giveŝ
wheremc t is the log deviation of real marginal cost M C t ≡ M C R t /P H,t . The linearisation utilises the following expression for Q t,t+k :
and the definition of P H,t , Eq. (16).
Utilising the relationship amongp t ,p H,t andŝ t given earlier, we can show that
Plugging this expression into the linearised equation above yieldŝ
Finally an expression formc t is obtained by linearising the following equation
combined with Eq. (5) and (11). This giveŝ
The New-Keynesian Phillips curve for the small open economy is given by Eq. (32) and (33).
Linearised Interest Rate Rule and Law of Motion for Exogenous Shocks
Let the target values of inflation rate and output be their steady state values, the linearisation of Eq. (22) and (23) yields the linearised interest rate rulê
Linearing Eq. (12), (20) and (27) gives the linearised law of motions for exogenous variableŝ
The linearised equilibrium conditions, Eq. (28) to (37) characterise the transition equations of the state variables.
Observation Equations
The observation equations for output growth rate (Y Grow t ), inflation rate (IN F t ), domestic interest rate (IN T R t ) and growth rate of nominal government transfer payment (GGrow t ) are given by
whereR is the steady state gross interest rate (R = 1/β). Then Eq. (28) 
